HMAS Darwin, Ted Egan, Lord Nelson, Alfred Thayer Mahan and George W. Bush To our surprise, on the morning of Saturday 15 October, all quiet otherwise, persons with weapons appeared on the streets of Darwin. HMAS Darwin, based in Perth, was in town, about to march through the city in a traditional ceremony to restate their rights to Freedom of the City (freedom to bear arms in the city). The gentleman in the wig, wearing garments seeming quite unsuitable for a hot tropical day, has brought the lot of them to a halt, with an upraised arm, the assistance of a just-at-the-right-moment red traffic light and (seemly a breakdown in intelligence involved somewhere) the hearty cry: "HALT! WHO GOES THERE?"
The answer was apparently satisfactory, because after a rather lengthy statement, the parade proceeded.
On the dias to receive the salute was the Administrator, the wonderful Ted Egan, to the right of the mayor (who clearly favours dress-ups more than does the Administrator), the Naval Officer in Charge, Northern Australia and the Commander of HMAS Darwin.
There was an audience across the road... The day before we had marvelled at the facade of a Woolworths supermarket with a mural such as no Woolworths anywhere else boasts.
In the evening we exchanged pleasantries with a Lieutenant Commander and his wife, dressed formally and grandly, proceeding to a dinner to mark the 200th anniversary of the Battle of Trafalgar. The officer remarked on Nelson's remarkable achievements in the battle. I noted that indeed, Nelson's achievements had inspired Alfred Thayer Mahan (first commander of the US Naval War College) to write his classic The Influence of Sea Power upon History with its long reach into modern American strategic thought. "Ah yes," said the officer, "1890 and forever more." Indeed — though we had no chance to discuss this further. Any serious study of US foreign and strategic policy requires an understanding of Mahan's perspective that there can only ever be one preponderant naval force. Despite, say, Kissinger's vision of himself as a modern Metternich working for balance of power, the reality of the short 'American century' has been pursuit of that preponderance under the influence of that strategic teaching. The tactical problems of US forces in some peacekeeping situations, like some problems in American foreign policy, have reflected this pervasive concern to impose preponderant force, to refuse to submit to international political structure, with some notion that political control over local and world order will follow from that. Which it does not for long. As is very evident in Iraq. One dominant force is a perspective which is relevant to the particular and isolated perspectives of naval power and command of the sea, but it has less to do with the politico-strategic management of a crowded planet than, say,we might learn from the angry behaviour of ants. It is in the end a win-all or lose-all notion for which the world should have no further use. It arises, of course, not only from Mahan but from the mindset of especially the western branch of the species Homo sapiens: fundamental belief in its rights of ownership of the rest of the planet. Just as Machievelli described rather than invented Machiavellianism, an ancient set of behaviours, so Mahan did not invent species arrogance or cultural determination to dominate others. Proceed, if you wish, from here to contrast with the perspective of the world of Aboriginal people in Ngukurr. Join my learning process here.
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